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Abstract
We consider imperfect information stochastic games where we require the players to use pure
(i.e. non randomised) strategies. We consider reachability, safety, Büchi and co-Büchi objectives,
and investigate the existence of almost-sure/positively winning strategies for the first player
when the second player is perfectly informed or more informed than the first player. We obtain
decidability results for positive reachability and almost-sure Büchi with optimal algorithms to
decide existence of a pure winning strategy and to compute one if it exists. We complete the
picture by showing that positive safety is undecidable when restricting to pure strategies even if
the second player is perfectly informed.
1 Introduction
The study of two-player games has received a lot of attention in the last decade, mainly motivated
by applications to the verification of reactive open systems. Those systems are composed of a pro-
gram (represented by the first player, Eve) and some (possibly hostile) environment (represented
by the second player, Adam). The verification problem consists in deciding whether the program
can be restricted so that the system meets some given specification whatever the environment
does. Here, restricting the program means synthesizing a controller [15], which, in terms of
games, is equivalent to designing a strategy for Eve that is winning against any strategy of Adam.
Of course, the class of games to consider depends on the class of systems that one intends to
model. This may lead to consider various features such as concurrency (the players independently
and simultaneously choose their action, whose parallel execution determines the next state),
stochastic transitions (the next state is chosen according to a probability distribution depending
on the current state and on the actions chosen by the players) or imperfect information (the
players do not observe the exact state). Note that imperfect information is necessary if one
wants for instance to model a system where the program and the environment share some public
variables while having also their own private variables [16].
Recently in [13, 2, 3] two (mainly equivalent) models of concurrent stochastic games with
imperfect information have been introduced. They permit to capture several known models (as
those from [9, 6, 7]) while preserving the main decidability results.
In this paper we consider the games as introduced in [13, 2, 3] (we use the formalism of [13]).
These are finite state games in which, at each round, the two players choose concurrently an
action and based on these actions the successor state is chosen according to some fixed proba-
bility distribution. The resulting infinite play is won by Eve if it satisfies a given objective. The
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objectives we consider here are reachability (i.e. a final state is eventually visited), safety (i.e. no
forbidden state is visited), Büchi (i.e. some final state is visited infinitely often) and co-Büchi (i.e.
no forbidden states is visited infinitely often). Imperfect information is modelled as follows: both
players have an equivalence relation over states and, instead of observing the exact state, they
only observe its equivalence class. Intuitively, two equivalent states are indistinguishable by the
corresponding player.
In [13, 2, 3] the authors were considering general strategies where a player is allowed to use
randomisation when choosing her/his next action. It was then shown, for Büchi objectives, that
one can decide whether Eve has such a strategy ϕ that is almost-surely winning against any
strategy ψ of Adam (meaning that an infinite play played according to ϕ and ψ is won by Eve with
probability 1). It was also established in [2, 3] that one can decide for co-Büchi objectives whether
Eve has a positively winning strategy.
In the present work we restrict our attention to pure strategies, i.e. we forbid the players to
randomise when choosing their actions. Our initial motivation for this work comes from automata
theory. The emptiness problem for automata on infinite trees can be described as the problem of
computing a winning strategy in a two-player game of infinite duration. The required game model
depends on the class of automata that is considered. In particular, [11] proposes a reduction of
the emptiness problem for alternating tree automata to the existence of a pure winning strategy
for Eve in an imperfect information game. For capturing the automaton model with a qualitative
acceptance condition as introduced in [5], one furthermore needs stochastic games (and up to
now this is the only known method for checking emptiness of such automata). So one of our aims
is to obtain a toolbox and to understand the limits of this method for checking emptiness of tree
automata.
Another motivation for studying pure strategies comes from controller synthesis. Indeed, a
classical way to consider an open system (i.e. a controllable program interacting with an un-
controllable environment) is as a two-player game, and in this setting synthesising a controller
for the program boils down to compute a winning strategy in the game for the player standing
for the program. In the setting of open systems, imperfect information naturally arises, for in-
stance when the program and its environment use private variables. A desirable property of a
controller (in addition to its optimality) is its implementability which could be limited by its size
but also by the required features. In the imperfect information setting, the main needed feature
might be randomisation which is well-known to be non-trivial to implement in a non-biased fash-
ion: hence, existence of an optimal non-randomised controller (equivalently a pure strategy) is a
natural question.
Our main results are the following. On the negative side, by a reduction of the value 1 problem
for probabilistic word automata [12], we prove that even if Adam is fully informed and Eve is
totally blind (i.e. all states are indistinguishable for her), it is undecidable whether Eve can
positively win a safety game (Section 3). Under the same restrictions, positive winning in Büchi
games and almost-sure winning in co-Büchi games are proved to be undecidable by reduction
from the emptiness problem for probabilistic ω-word automata [1].
To obtain positive results, we have to impose restrictions on how Adam is informed. We
consider the case where he has perfect information and the case where he is more informed than
Eve1. In both situations we show that it is decidable whether Eve has a positively winning pure
strategy in a reachability game (Section 4). Using this result in a fixpoint computation, we prove
that one can decide whether Eve has an almost-surely winning pure strategy in a Büchi game
(Section 5). Moreover, if it exists, such a strategy can be constructed and requires finite memory.
In both cases, we obtain matching upper and lower complexity bounds.
The decidability results for the special case where Adam is perfectly informed were also ob-
tained in [8]. However, the technique we develop here is different and in particular uses the
positive winning case as a toolbox, which later permits us to handle the more general case where
Adam is more informed than Eve. And while [8] focuses on reachability conditions and studies
the memory required for winning strategies depending on how the players are informed, we focus
1We say that Adam is more informed than Eve when his equivalence relation on the states of the games refines that of
Eve. In particular, this is the case when Adam is perfectly informed.
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on the case in which Adam is better informed than Eve (or even perfectly informed), and study
different winning conditions.
In our setting (restricting to pure strategies) the algorithmic complexity increases to 2-EXPTIME
while it is only EXPTIME in the general setting (allowing randomised strategies) when Adam is
more informed than Eve. Also note that in the latter setting one has decidability results in the
case where no assumption is made on how Adam and Eve are informed while in our setting this
question is left open.
The resulting complete picture is summarised in the table at the end of this paper.
2 Definitions
A probability distribution over a finite set X is a mapping d : X Ñ r0, 1s such that
ř
xPX dpxq “ 1.
In the sequel we denote by DpXq the set of probability distributions over X. Given some set X
and some equivalence relation „ over X, rxs„ stands for the equivalence class of x for „ and
X{„ “ trxs„ | x P Xu denotes the set of equivalence classes of „. As usual we write A
˚ (resp. Aω)
for the set of finite (resp. infinite) words over some finite alphabet A. For k ě 0 we denote by Aěk
(resp. Aďk) the set of words of length at least (resp. at most) k.
A concurrent arena with imperfect information (or simply an arena) is defined as a tuple
A “ pS,ΣE ,ΣA, δ,„E,„Aq where S is a finite set of states; ΣE (resp. ΣA) is the (finite) set of actions
for Eve (resp. Adam); δ : S ˆΣE ˆΣA Ñ DpSq is the (total) transition function; and „E and „A are
equivalence relations over states.
A play in such an arena proceeds as follows. First it starts in some initial state s. Then the
first player, Eve, picks an action σE P ΣE and, simultaneously and independently, the second
player, Adam, chooses an action σA P ΣA. Then a successor state is chosen according to the
probability distribution δps, σE , σAq, and the process restarts: the players choose a new pair of
actions that induces, together with the current state, a new state and so on forever. Hence, a
play is an infinite sequence s0pσ
0
E , σ
0
Aqs1pσ
1
E , σ
1
Aqs2 ¨ ¨ ¨ in pS ¨ pΣE ˆ ΣAqq
ω such that for every i ě 0,
δpsi, σ
i
E , σ
i
Aqpsi`1q ą 0. In the sequel we refer to a prefix of a play ending by a state as a partial
play.
The intuitive meaning of „E (resp. „A) is that two states s1 and s2 such that s1 „E s2 (resp.
s1 „A s2) cannot be distinguished by Eve (resp. by Adam). We easily extend relation „X , with
X P tE,Au, to partial plays as follows. First, for any partial play λ “ s0pσ
0
E , σ
0
Aqs1pσ
1
E , σ
1
Aq ¨ ¨ ¨ sk
denote rλs„X “ rs0s„X rs1s„X ¨ ¨ ¨ rsks„X ; then define λ „X λ
1 if and only if rλs„X “ rλ
1s„X .
We say that Adam is more informed than Eve if „AĎ„E, and Adam is perfectly informed if
„A is the equality relation.
Example 1. Consider the concurrent game with imperfect information depicted in Figure 1. Let
ΣE “ ΣA “ ta, bu. The initial state is s0 and from s0 if Adam plays the action a then any action
played by Eve leads with probability 1
2
either to s1 or to s2. Similarly if Adam plays b then any
action played by Eve leads with probability 1
2
either to s3 or to s4. In the states s1, s2, s3 and s4,
which are indistinguishable by Eve, the action of Adam has no impact. If Eve plays a from s1 or s4
or b from s2 or s3 the play goes to the final state f which is a sink state. Any other action by Eve
from one of those states leave the current state unchanged.
In order to choose their moves the players respect strategies, and, for this, they may use all the
information they have about what was played so far. However, if two partial plays are equivalent
for „E (resp. „E), then Eve (resp. Adam) cannot distinguish between them, and should behave
the same. This leads to the following notion.
An observation-based pure strategy (simply called a strategy in the following) for Eve is
a function ϕ : pS{„E q
˚ Ñ ΣE, i.e., to choose her next action, Eve considers the sequence of
observations she has seen so far. We overload ϕ by writing ϕpλq instead of ϕprλs„E q: in particular,
a strategy ϕ for Eve is such that ϕpλq “ ϕpλ1q whenever λ „E λ
1 (and similarly for Adam).
A finite-memory strategy for Eve is a strategy that can be computed by a finite automaton
with output that reads the observation sequence of the partial play and outputs the next action
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s0
s1
s2
s3
s4
˚|a
1
2
1
2
˚|b
1
2
1
2
f ˚|˚
a |˚
b |˚
b |˚
a |˚
b |˚
a |˚
a |˚
b |˚
Figure 1: A concurrent arena where Adam is perfectly informed while Eve cannot distinguish
states s1, s2, s3 and s4.
of Eve. We do not give a precise technical definition because it is not needed in this work. The
size of such a strategy corresponds to the number of states of the automaton.
Strategies for Adam are defined in a similar way by replacing „E by „A.
Remark 1. In our definition of a strategy we implicitly assume that the players only observe the
sequence of states and not the corresponding sequence of actions. While the fact that a player
does not observe what his adversary has played is reasonable (otherwise imperfect information
on states would make less sense) one could object that the player should observe the actions she
has played so far. However, as the players do not use randomisation in their strategies, they can
always retrieve the actions they played so far.
Moreover, in the special case where Adam is more informed than Eve (as later studied in Sec-
tion 4.4), we can also note that, when playing against a fixed strategy of Eve, he can always retrieve
the actions she played so far (as he knows the strategy of Eve and also rλs„E for any partial play
λ).
Let A “ pS,ΣE ,ΣA, δ,„E,„A, q be an arena, let s0 P S be an initial state, ϕE be a strategy
for Eve and ϕA be a strategy for Adam. First we let Outcomesps0, ϕE , ϕAq to be the set of all
possible plays when the game starts in s0 and when Eve and Adam respectively follows ϕE and
ϕA: λ “ s0pσ
0
E , σ
0
Aqs1pσ
1
E , σ
1
Aq ¨ ¨ ¨ belongs to Outcomesps0, ϕE , ϕAq iff
δpsi, ϕEprs0s{„E rs0s{„E ¨ ¨ ¨ rsis{„E q, ϕAprs0s{„Ars0s{„A ¨ ¨ ¨ rsis{„Aqqpsi`1q ą 0
for every i ě 0. Then we are interested in defining the probability of a (measurable) set of plays,
knowing that Eve (resp. Adam) uses ϕE (resp. ϕA). This is done in the usual way (see e.g. [6]):
once a pair pϕE , ϕAq of strategies for both players is fixed, one is left with a (possibly infinite)
Markov chain that naturally induces a probability space over the Borel σ-field generated by the
cones, where for any partial play λ starting in s0 the cone for λ is the set conepλq “ λ¨ppΣEˆΣAq¨Sq
ω
of all infinite plays with prefix λ. We let PrϕE,ϕAs0 denote the corresponding probability measure
over this space.
An objective for Eve is a (measurable) set O of plays: a play is won by Eve if it belongs to O;
otherwise it is won by Adam. A concurrent game with imperfect information (simply called a
game in the following) is a triple G “ pA, s0,Oq where A is an arena, s0 is an initial state and O is
an objective. In the sequel we focus on the following special classes of ω-regular objectives (note
that all of them are Borel sets hence, measurable) that we define using a subset F Ď S of final
states.
A reachability objective (resp. safety) is of the form pS ¨ pΣE ˆ ΣAqq
˚F ppΣE ˆ ΣAq ¨ Sq
ω (resp.
of the form ppSzF q ¨ pΣE ˆ ΣAqq
ω) : a play is winning if it contains (resp. does not contain) a final
state.
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A Büchi objective (resp. co-Büchi objective) is of the form
Ş
kě0pS¨pΣEˆΣAqq
ěkF ppΣEˆΣAq¨Sq
ω
(resp. of the form pS ¨ pΣE ˆ ΣAqq
˚ppSzF q ¨ pΣE ˆ ΣAqq
ω) : a play is winning if it goes infinitely often
(resp. finitely often) through final states.
A reachability (resp. safety, Büchi, co-Büchi) game is a game equipped with a reachability
(resp. safety, Büchi, co-Büchi) objective. In the sequel we may replace O by F when it is clear
from the context which objective we consider.
Fix a game G “ pA, s0,Oq. A strategy ϕE for Eve is surely winning if, for any counter-strategy
ϕA for Adam, Outcomesps0, ϕE , ϕAq Ď O. If such a strategy exists, we say that Eve surely wins G.
A strategy ϕE for Eve is almost-surely winning (resp. positively winning) if, for any counter-
strategy ϕA for Adam, Pr
ϕE ,ϕA
s0
pOq “ 1 (resp. ą 0). If such a strategy exists, we say that Eve
almost-surely wins (resp. positively wins) G.
In this paper, we are interested in deciding existence of almost-surely/positively winning
strategies for Eve for safety/reachability/Büchi/co-Büchi games.
Example 2. Consider the (perfect information) concurrent reachability game depicted below with qf
as the unique final state. In state qw, if both players choose the same action then they stay in state
qw and otherwise they move to state qf . In state qf , all choices of actions stay in state qf . Eve does
not have any almost-surely winning strategy.
qw qf
0 |1
1 |0
0 |0 1 |1 ˚|˚
Indeed, given any strategy ϕE for Eve, the counter-strategy ϕA for Adam mirroring the strategy
of Eve ( i.e. ϕA “ ϕE ) only allows for the play q
ω
w and hence, Pr
ϕE ,ϕA
s0
pOq “ 0. Similarly Adam does not
have an almost-surely winning strategy. For any fixed strategy ϕA of Adam, any counter-strategy
ϕE for Eve that satisfies ϕEpqwq ‰ ϕApqwq is such that Pr
ϕE,ϕA
s0
pOq “ 1.
3 Undecidability Results
In this section we provide undecidability results for certain combinations of types of winning
strategies and objectives. An easy consequence of undecidability results for probabilistic ω-
automata from [1] is stated in the following theorem. In these reductions, Eve plays alone and
cannot distinguish any states of the game. The states and transitions of the game are those of
the ω-automaton and the strategy of Eve corresponds to the input word.
Theorem 1. The decision problems whether Eve almost-surely wins a given co-Büchi game or pos-
itively wins a given Büchi game are undecidable (even if the set of actions of Adam is a singleton).
Proof. Consider a probabilistic automaton A on ω-words as in [1]. Now consider a concurrent
game with imperfect information where Adam plays no role and where Eve’s actions are the
letters from the input alphabet A of A and whose states are the ones of the automaton. Moreover
all states are „E-equivalent. Now the transition function of the game mimics the one of the
automaton. As Eve does not observe anything, a (pure) strategy ϕ of Eve can be described as
an infinite word uϕ in A (the i-th letter being the i-th action played by Eve), and ϕ is almost-
surely (resp. positively) winning iff the probability of a run of A over uϕ to be accepting is 1
(resp. strictly positive). The undecidability results follow from the undecidability of the emptiness
problem for co-Büchi (resp. Büchi) probabilistic automaton with the almost-sure (resp. positive)
semantics [1].
In the following we prove that the existence of positively winning strategies for safety objectives
is undecidable. Our result is based on the undecidability of the value 1 problem for probabilistic
automata on finite words [12]. For simpler use in our reduction we reformulate this problem in
terms of games.
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shideshome swet
w |r
t |h
t |r
w |h
˚|˚
˚ |˚
Figure 2: The Hide-or-Run game
Consider the class of concurrent reachability games G with imperfect information with the
following properties. Eve is blind (i.e. „E consists of a unique equivalence class), and Adam has
no impact on the game (i.e. his set of actions is a singleton). Furthermore, there is a special
action 7 that Eve can play at any time, and that leads (depending on the current state) either to a
final sink state or to a non-final sink state. The final sink state is the only final state. Intuitively,
one can think of such a game as one where Eve plays a sequence of actions and then declares by
7 that she stops (and she wins if she stopped in a state that leads to the winning sink).
We refer to this type of game as probabilistic automaton game (PA game) because it corresponds
to probabilistic automaton on finite words (see [14] for an introduction to probabilistic automata):
a strategy of Eve corresponds to a finite word followed by 7 (without playing 7 Eve surely loses), and
the probability that it is winning is the probability of the word to be accepted in the automaton.
Then we have the following result, which directly follows from the undecidability of the value 1
problem for probabilistic automata [12].
Lemma 1. For a given a PA game, it is undecidable whether Eve has for each 0 ă ε ă 1 a strategy
that is winning with probability p1´ εq ă p ă 1.
Our reduction that uses Lemma 1 starts from an example of a concurrent safety game GHR
known as Hide-or-Run [10] (see Figure 2). In this game, Adam can choose between hiding (h) and
running (r), and Eve can choose between waiting (w) and throwing (t) her only snowball. If Adam
hides and Eve waits, the game stays in state shide. If Adam runs and Eve throws the snowball,
then Adam is hit, and the game proceeds to sink state swet. In all other cases, Adam gets home
(either he runs without being hit or he can safely run after Eve has thrown her snowball) and the
game proceeds to sink state shome. This is a safety game where Eve wants to avoid visiting shome.
In [10] it is shown that Eve can only win by using a randomised strategy that plays action w
in round i with probability pi such that 0 ă pi ă 1 for every i and
ś
i pi ą 0 (for this, Eve does not
have to distinguish the states).
Now the idea is to incorporate a gadget in GHR that permits Eve to simulate random choices
while playing deterministically.
Theorem 2. It is undecidable whether Eve positively wins in a safety game (resp. co-Büchi game),
even if „E consists of a single equivalence class.
Proof. Consider a probabilistic automaton game G with a set of actions disjoint from the one
in the game GHR. Let Gr and Gh be two disjoint copies of G where we removed the two states
reachable by Eve playing 7 (the 7-edges are redirected as described below).
In the game G1HR (see Figure 3), the concurrent choices of the actions in GHR are simulated by
the imperfect information. All states are indistinguishable by Eve. First Adam makes his choice
r or h from shide (Eve’s action has no impact). The game then moves to the initial state of Gr or
Gh, depending on the choice of Adam (ignore the action cheat for the moment, which is explained
later). Because of the imperfect information Eve does not observe Adam’s choice.
In Gr and Gh we removed the target states of 7 but Eve can still play 7: if in G it was leading to
the final state it now behaves as Eve playing w from shide, and otherwise it behaves as Eve playing
t from shide (see Figure 3).
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shide
shome swet˚|˚ ˚ |˚
Gr Gh
sc
sw
sl
˚|cheat
7 |˚
˚ |˚
˚ |˚
x |˚
1{2
1{2
˚|r
7 |˚
7 |˚
˚ |h 7 |˚
7 |˚
Figure 3: The modified version of Hide-or-Run: G1HR. Black states in Gr/Gh correspond to states
from which 7 led to the final state in G, and x denotes any letter different from 7.
Finally, in order to prevent Eve from playing an infinite sequence of actions without 7, we add
an extra small gadget where Adam is allowed to declare that Eve will cheat. If he plays cheat from
shide this leads to a new state sc where the following may happen depending on the next move of
Eve (the action of Adam has no impact): if she plays 7 from sc then the play goes to a sink state
sw (that is not final); if she does not play 7 from sc then with probability 1{2 the play stays in sc
and with probability 1{2 the play goes to a sink final state sl. Hence, from sc if she never plays 7,
then the play almost-surely ends in sl.
Let G1HR be this new game, where we recall that all states are indistinguishable for Eve, shide is
the initial state and tshome, slu are the final states. We claim that Eve positively wins game G
1
HR iff
Eve in G has strategies winning with probability arbitrarily close to 1. Indeed, consider a strategy
ϕ for Eve in G1HR. As Eve cannot distinguish any state in G
1
HR, and does not observe the actions
played by Adam, ϕ is independent of Adam’s choices.
If the strategy of Eve consists in playing 7 only finitely often, it cannot be positively winning
as it suffices for Adam to wait for the last 7 and then play cheat. More precisely, the strategy of
Adam consists in playing (in state shide) the action h whenever Eve’s strategy will still play 7 in the
future, and cheat if Eve will never play 7 in the future. It can be shown that following this strategy
Adam wins against the strategy of Eve with probability 1.
Thus, in the following we only consider strategies ϕ of Eve that play 7 infinitely often. An
equivalent description of such strategies ϕ is by a sequence pϕiqiě1 of strategies for Eve in G: ϕ
consists in playing an arbitrary letter then playing as ϕ1 until playing 7, then playing an arbitrary
letter, then playing as ϕ2 until playing 7 and so on (the arbitrary letter is used here when Adam
chooses to move to Gr, Gh or sc).
For one direction, assume that ϕ is positively winning in G1HR. Let pi be the probability that
Eve wins in G when playing according to ϕi. Then, from the properties of GHR, it follows that ϕ is
winning iff 0 ă pi ă 1 for every i ě 1 and
ś
i pi ą 0. This implies that the sequence ppiqiě1 converges
to 1 and hence the ϕi are strategies as in Lemma 1.
Conversely, if Eve has strategies winning with probabilities arbitrarily close to 1 as in Lemma 1,
then one can choose the ϕi such that 1 ą pi ě 1 ´
1
pi` 1q2
which ensures 0 ă pi ă 1 for every i ě 1
and
ś
i pi ą 0. Indeed,
ź
iě1
1´
1
pi` 1q2
“ lim
mÑ8
mź
i“1
1´
1
pi` 1q2
“ lim
mÑ8
m` 2
2m` 2
“
1
2
This family ϕi defines a strategy for Eve in G
1
HR. Again using the properties of GHR, this implies
that Eve positively wins against all strategies of Adam: either no outcome ever reaches sc, in
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which case GHR is simulated, or if an outcome reaches sc, then it does with positive probability,
and then it also reaches sw with positive probability.
4 Positive Winning in Reachability Games
We now address the decidability of whether Eve positively wins in a reachability game, and we
show decidability (and matching lower bounds) for the case where (i) Adam is perfectly informed
and (ii) Adam is more informed than Eve.
For the rest of this section fix an arena A “ pS,ΣE ,ΣA, δ,„E,„Aq and a set of final states F Ď S.
To later address almost-sure winning (Section 5) we need to consider games that may start in
different states, and we are interested in strategies that are winning from all of these states. For
this reason, we define for any subset B of states a game pA, B,Oq that is played as follows: there
is a new initial step where Adam picks a state s0 in B and then the play proceeds as in pA, s0,Oq.
Hence, a strategy ϕ for Eve in such a game is almost-surely (resp. positively) winning iff ϕ is
almost-surely (resp. positively) winning in pA, s0,Oq for every state s0 P B.
4.1 Winning in a Finite Number of Moves.
We start with a general result that does not depend on how the players are informed. It states
that if Eve can positively win in a reachability game then she can do so within a bounded number
of moves.
Proposition 1. Let B Ď S be a subset of states and assume that Eve has a positively winning
strategy ϕ in the reachability game pA, B, F q. Then, there is a bound N and some 0 ă εB ď 1 such
that whenever Eve respects ϕ in the game pA, B, F q, the probability that the resulting play visits a
final state within the N first moves is at least εB.
Proof. For any N ą 0, any s P B and any strategy ψN for Adam, call p
ψN ,s
N the probability of the
event "a play in pA, s, F q, where Eve respects ϕ and Adam respects ψN visits a final state within the
N first moves".
Let xψNN “ mintp
ψN ,s
N | s P Bu. We aim to show that there exists some N ą 0 such that for each
strategy ψN for Adam, x
ψN
N ą 0.
For this, we reason by contradiction, assuming that for any bound N ą 0, Adam has a counter
strategy ψN such that x
ψN
N “ 0. In particular, there is a state s P B such that p
ψN ,s
N “ 0 for infinitely
many N . Hence, we can assume that the ψN are such that p
ψN ,s
N “ 0 for every N ě 0 (as to get the
property for some N Adam can always use the strategy for some N 1 ą N ).
Using pψN qNě0 we define a strategy ψ for Adam as follows. We first let I0 “ N be the set of
naturals. Next we define ψ and pIkqkě0, a decreasing sequence (for inclusion) of infinite subsets of
the naturals. First we sort partial plays by increasing length. We assume that ψ is defined on all
partial plays of length smaller than k (hence initialization for k “ 0 comes for free) and for plays of
length k` 1 we do the following. As there are finitely many plays of length k` 1 while Ik is infinite
there exists an infinite subset Ik`1 Ď Ik such that, for all j1, j2 P Ik`1, both strategies ψj1 and ψj2
agree on plays of length k ` 1; we define ψ to behave accordingly on plays of length k ` 1.
Then, the following is a direct consequence of the definitions of ψ and pIkqkě0: for every k ě 0,
the set Ik is infinite; and for every j P Ik and every partial play λ of length smaller than k, both ψ
and ψj agree on λ.
In particular it implies that xψN “ 0 for every N ě 0: indeed, x
ψM
N “ 0 for any M ě N and
ψ agrees with all ψM with M P IN (and as IN is infinite such an M exists). Finally, as 0 ď
Prϕ,ψs pOq ď
ř
Ně0 x
ψ
N “ 0 (here O denotes the reachability objective defined by F ), we conclude that
Prϕ,ψs pOq “ 0 which contradicts our initial assumption of ϕ being positively winning in pA, s, F q.
The fact that there is some εB ą 0 such that ϕ ensures to reach a final state in less than N
moves with a probability greater than εB is a direct consequence of the fact that one bounds the
number of moves by N .
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Remark 2. Proposition 1 implies that finite memory suffices for Eve to positively win in a reach-
ability game. Indeed, it suffices to follow ϕ for the N first moves and then play the same action
forever.
Another important consequence is that the values of the probabilities do not have any influence
on whether Eve positively wins in a reachability game. More precisely consider another arena A1
that is exactly as A except that its transition function δ1 is such that for every state s and every
pair of actions pσE , σAq one has δps, σE , σAq “ 0 iff δ
1ps, σE , σAq “ 0. Then Eve positively wins in the
reachability game pA, B, F q iff she positively wins in the reachability game pA1, B, F q.
4.2 Positively Winning When Adam Is Perfectly Informed
We now assume that Adam is perfectly informed.
Consider for every n ě 0, the objective ReachďnpF q “ pS ¨ pΣE ˆ ΣAqq
ănF ppΣE ˆ ΣAq ¨ Sq
ω where
a final state has to be visited within the first n steps. The following inductively characterises the
sets B for which Eve can win pA, B,ReachďnpF qq.
Proposition 2. Let B Ď S be a set of pairwise „E-equivalent states and let n ą 0. Eve positively
wins pA, B,ReachďnpF qq if and only if there exists an action σE P ΣE and a set B
1 Ď S such that
• Eve positively wins pA, B1,Reachďn´1pF qq,
• for every s P BzF and for every σA P ΣA, there exists s
1 P B1 such that δps, σE , σAqps
1q ą 0.
Proof. Fix a set B Ď S of pairwise equivalent states and an integer n ą 0. For the direct implication
assume that Eve has a positively winning strategy ϕ in pA, B,ReachďnpF qq. Let σE “ ϕprBs„E q be
the first action played by Eve and let ϕ1 be the strategy followed by Eve after this first step (i.e.
ϕ1pλq “ ϕprBs„E ¨ λq for every partial play λ). Let B
1 be the set of states s1 such that ϕ1 is positively
winning in pA, s1,Reachďn´1pF qq.
We claim σE and B
1 satisfy the property of the statement. First and by definition ϕ1 is positively
winning in pA, B1,Reachďn´1pF qq. For the second property assume toward a contradiction that
there exist some σA P ΣA and some state s0 P B such that for every s P B
1, δps0, σE , σA, sq “ 0 then
ϕ1 is not positively winning in pA, s,Reachďn´1pF qq (i.e. there exists a strategy ψs of Adam such
that Prϕ
1,ψs
s pReach
ďn´1pF qq “ 0). Consider the strategy ψ for Adam consisting in playing first σA
and then the ψs corresponding to the observed state s (i.e. ψps0q “ σA and ψps0pσE , σAqλq “ ψspλq
for any partial play λ starting with s P B1). We have the following contradiction:
Prϕ,ψs0 pReach
ďnpF qq “
ÿ
sPB1
δps0, σE , σAqpsq ¨ Pr
ϕ1,ψs
s pReach
ďn´1pF qqloooooooooooooomoooooooooooooon
“0
“ 0.
For the converse implication assume that there exists an action σE P ΣE and a set B
1 Ď
S satisfying the properties of the statement. Fix a positively winning strategy ϕ1 for Eve in
pA, B1,Reachďn´1pF qq.
Consider the strategy ϕ for Eve in pA, B,ReachďnpF qq consisting of first playing σE and then
following ϕ1 (i.e. ϕprBs„E q “ σE and ϕprBs„E ¨ rλs„E q “ ϕ
1prλs„E q for every partial play λ). We claim
that this strategy is positively winning in pA, B,ReachďnpF qq.
Indeed, let ψ be a strategy for Adam in pA, B,ReachďnpF qq and let s0 P B. Let σA be the first
action played by Adam when using ψ and let ψ1 be the strategy followed by Adam after this first
step (i.e. ψ1pλq “ ψps0pσE , σAq ¨ λq for every partial play λ). By definition of B
1, there exists s1 P B1
such that δps0, σE , σAqps
1q ą 0. We have:
Prϕ,ψs0 pReach
ďnpF qq ě δps0, σE , σAqps
1q ¨ Prϕ
1,ψ1
s1 pReach
ďn´1pF qq ą 0.
Now, consider the increasing family of sets pWiqiě0 defined by:
• W0 “ tB | B Ď F u
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• Wi`1 “ tB Ď S | @r P B, DσE DB
1 PWi s.t. @s „E r with sP BzF , @σA Ds
1 P B1 s.t. δps, σE , σAqps
1q ą
0u
and call W its limit. Then the following is a simple consequence of Proposition 2.
Theorem 3. Let B Ď S be a non-empty set. Eve has a positively winning strategy ϕ in the game
pA, B, F q if and only if B PW. In particular it can be decided in time exponential in |S| whether Eve
has a positively winning strategy. If such a strategy exists, one can construct one that uses the
set 2S as memory, and this strategy guarantees to positively reach a final state within the 2|S| first
moves.
Proof. Using Proposition 2, by a direct induction on n one gets that B ‰ H belongs to Wn if and
only if Eve positively wins pA, B,ReachďnpF qq.
For any B P W, we denote by rkpBq the smallest n such that B P Wn. Now, for any B P W,
we define a strategy for Eve denoted ϕB that uses W as a finite memory. Initially the memory is
B. For a partial play λ ending in a state in some equivalence class rss„E and assuming that the
memory is B1, we define the strategy as follows:
• If rkpB1q ą 0 and if there exists r P rss„E XB
1, then by definition of pWiqiě0 there exists some
action σE and some set B
2 such that the following holds:
– rkpB2q “ rkpB1q ´ 1,
– @r1 „E r with r
1 P BzF,@σA, Ds
1 P B2, s.t. δps, σE , σAqps
1q ą 0.
Then we let ϕBpλq “ σE and update the memory to B
2.
• In all other cases, we take ϕBpλq to be an arbitrary action and update the memory to H.
By induction on n, we show that for every non-empty B PWn, the strategy ϕB is positively win-
ning in pA, B,ReachďnpF qq. The base case is immediate. Assume that the property is established
for n ´ 1 ě 0. Let B be a non-empty element of Wn. Let s0 P B, σE “ ϕBprs0s„E q and B
1 P Wn´1 be
the memory of ϕB after the first move. Let ψ be a strategy for Adam. Let σA be the first action
played by Adam when using ψ and let ψ1 be the strategy followed by Adam after this first step, i.e.
ψ1pλq “ ψps0 ¨ pσE , σAq¨λq for every partial play λ. By definition of B
1, there exists s1 P B1 such that
δps0, σE , σAqps
1q ą 0. Hence, we have:
PrϕB ,ψs0 pReach
ďnpF qq ě δps0, σE , σAqps
1q ¨ Pr
ϕ
B1
,ψ1
s1 pReach
ďn´1pF qq ą 0.
which concludes the proof.
The following is a restatement of the end of Theorem 3.
Corollary 1. In Proposition 1, when Adam is perfectly informed, one can always choose ϕ such
that N ď 2|S|.
4.3 Automaton-Compatible Strategies
The aim of this section is to refine Theorem 3 to positively winning strategies that satisfy further
constraints. The motivation is that in Section 5 we compute almost-sure winning strategies for
Büchi conditions using a fixpoint computation. In one iteration of this computation, we compute
positively winning strategies for reachability that satisfy an extra constraint (roughly, that Eve
can positively win the reachability game while ensuring that she can win another round of the
reachability game once the target set is reached). This further constraint is expressible by finite
automata that read partial plays and restrict the set of admissible next actions for Eve. Thus,
below we develop the notion of a strategy that is compatible with such an automaton and then
later apply it to the specific setting that we need.
Let T “ pQ,ΣE ˆ S{„E , q0, qs, δT , Actq be a deterministic finite automaton with input alphabet
ΣE ˆ S{„E , a finite set of states Q, an initial state q0, a sink state qs, a transition function δT :
Q ˆ pΣE ˆ S{„E q Ñ Q and a function Act : Q Ñ 2
ΣE associating with any state of T a subset of
actions for Eve. Moreover, we require that the following holds
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• Actpqq “ H if and only if q “ qs.
• For every state q and for every pσ, xq P ΣE ˆ S{„E one has δT pq, pσ, xqq “ qs if and only if
σ R Actpqq.
Such a machine associates with any partial play λ a unique state qλ defined by qs0 “ q0 and
qλ¨pσE ,σAq¨s “ δT pqλ, pσE , rss„Eqq; it also permits to associate with any partial play a subset of actions
by letting ActT pλq “ Actpqλq.
A strategy ϕ of Eve is T -compatible if for every partial play λ where Eve respects ϕ one has
ϕpλq P ActT pλq. Note that it implies that qλ ‰ qs.
Remark 3. Consider the special case of the automaton T0 defined as follows: Q consists only
of two states, the initial state and the sink state; δT pq0, pσ, xqq “ q0 and δT pqs, pσ, xqq “ qs for any
pσ, xq P ΣE ˆ S{„E ( i.e. all transitions are looping); and Act equals all actions ΣE in the initial state.
Then it follows that any strategy is T0-compatible.
Hence, by considering the special case of T0, any result we obtain later will also hold if we drop
the T -compatibility constraint.
In Section 5 and for the proof of Theorem 4, we work with automata that compute the belief
of Eve along a play, as explained below. For an initial belief set B0 Ď S of pairwise „E-equivalent
states, the belief (also known as knowledge) BeliefB0E pλq of Eve after a partial play λ starting in a
state of B0, intuitively corresponds to the set of possible states that can have been reached in a
play „E-equivalent to λ.
Formally, the value of BeliefB0E pλq can be inductively defined as follows: Belief
B0
E ps0q “ B0 and
BeliefB0E pλ ¨ pσE , σAq ¨ sq “ UpBeliefEpBelief
B0
E pλq, σE , rss„E q where the function UpBeliefE : 2
S ˆ ΣE ˆ
rSs{„E Ñ 2
S is defined by:
UpBeliefEpB, σE , rss„Eq “ tt P rss„E | Dr P B, DσA P ΣA s.t. δpr, σE , σAqptq ą 0u.
q0 q1
b |b
a |˚
b |˚
b |a a |˚
(a) Arena of Remark 4
s0
s2s1
t2f2t1 f1
˚
1
2
1
2
a
˚b ˚
a
˚b ˚
(b) Arena of Remark 6
Figure 4: Arenas and beliefs
Remark 4. The belief is in general smaller than the currently observed equivalence class. For
instance, consider the reachability game depicted in Figure 4a in which all states are equivalent.
If the strategy of Eve is to play pabbqω, then her observation is always the same (as all states are
equivalent). Her initial belief is tq0, q1u but after playing a it becomes tq1u and after a b it becomes
tq0u and after another b it becomes tq0, q1u.
Remark 5. Given a family B Ď 2S of beliefs for Eve (in the sense that each B P B is a subset of a
„E-class), one can construct an automaton TB such that the TB-compatible strategies are precisely
those such that Eve’s belief always remains inside B. The states of TB are the elements of B, the
transition function is defined by UpBeliefE , and the actions ActpBq enabled at a state B are those
that ensure that the belief remains inside B.
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Remark 6. In [13, 2, 3], it is shown that if Eve can almost-surely win (using randomised strategies)
a Büchi game, she can do so using a strategy ϕ that only depends on the belief, i.e. ϕpλq “ ϕpλ1q
whenever Beliefϕpλq “ Beliefϕpλ1q. However, even if Eve is playing alone, this is no longer true2 (even
for reachability games) in our setting where we restrict to pure ( i.e. non-randomised) strategies.
Consider the reachability game in Figure 4 where Eve is playing alone. The equivalence relation is
given by s1 „E s2, t1 „E f2 and t2 „E f1.
If the game starts in s0 then whatever strategy Eve uses, her belief always coincides with her
observation. Eve can surely win (she can simply play the sequence aaab). But if her strategy only
depends on her belief then she necessarily plays a sequence of actions of the form xuω where
x P ta, bu and u is a two-letter word, and thus she has a probability 1
2
to win using such a strategy.
We now return to the strengthening of Theorem 3. We assume that Adam is perfectly informed
and we fix an automaton T “ pQ,ΣE ˆ S{„E , q0, qs, δT , Actq as in Section 4.3. We are interested in
checking whether Eve has a T -compatible strategy that is positively winning in the reachability
game pA, B, F q.
Our main result is the following and its proof is by two successive reductions and an applica-
tion of Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. When Adam is perfectly informed, one can decide in exponential time in |S| and poly-
nomial in |Q| whether Eve has a T -compatible strategy that is positively winning in the reachability
game pA, B, F q. If such a strategy exists, one can construct one that uses memory of size polynomial
in |Q| and exponential in |S|.
Proof. Note that adding the condition on the strategy being T -compatible somehow means that
once a final state is reached the play is not yet won by Eve because she needs to keep playing
in accordance with T (i.e. she must avoid to produce a partial play λ with qλ “ qs). Hence, it is
natural to consider an enriched arena AT that embeds T . For this let AT “ pS ˆQ,ΣE ,ΣA, δ
1,«E
,«Aq where
• δ1pps, qq, σE , σAqps
1, q1q equals δps, σE , σAqps
1q if q1 “ δT pq, pσE , rs
1s„E qq and otherwise it equals 0;
• ps1, q1q «E ps2, q2q if and only if s1 „E s2 and q1 “ q2; and
• «A is the equality relation, i.e. Adam is perfectly informed.
Of special interest is the safety game pAT , B ˆ tq0u, S ˆ tqsuq and we are interested in sure
winning for Eve because of the following straightforward lemma
Lemma 2. Eve has a (possibly losing) T -compatible strategy in the reachability game pA, B, F q if
and only if she has a surely winning strategy in the safety game pAT , B ˆ tq0u, S ˆ tqsuq.
It is a known result [4] that when one considers sure winning for Eve in a safety game, winning
strategies only depend on the belief of Eve (in the sense of Section 4.3). More precisely consider
the (unique) largest subset B of beliefs and the (unique) mapping Aut : B Ñ 2ΣE such that the
following holds.
• No belief B P B contains a forbidden state.
• For every B P B, the set AutpBq which consists of all those actions σE P AutpBq such that for
every action σA P ΣA one has UpBeliefEpB, σE , rss„E q P B, is not empty; i.e. actions in AutpBq
are those that ensure that the updated belief will still be in B regardless of the action of
Adam.
Then Eve surely wins the safety game from configurations where her belief B is in B and a strategy
consists in choosing any action in AutpBq.
Note that in the safety game pAT , B ˆ tq0u, S ˆ tqsuq, Eve’s beliefs are elements in 2
S ˆQ (as we
have that ps1, q1q «E ps2, q2q implies q1 “ q2).
2This fact is also observed in [8].
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Now consider an automaton T 1 “ pQ1,ΣE ˆ S{„E , q
1
0, q
1
s, δT 1 , Act
1q that computes Eve’s belief (as
explained in Remark 5. Hence, T 1 is the same as TB) in the previous safety game and uses
function Aut “ Act1 to define those authorised actions. To fit the definition, merge all beliefs not
in B in a sink state and define Aut to be equal to H on it. The states Q1 of T 1 are elements of B
(plus the sink state) and one takes as the initial state q10 “ B ˆ tq0u (which possibly is the sink
state). In particular the number of states of T 1 is exponential in |S| and linear in |Q|.
Now one can go back to the original arena and consider the enriched arena AT 1 . Then we have
the following easy lemma.
Lemma 3. Eve has a T -compatible positively winning strategy in the reachability game pA, B, F q
if and only if she has a positively winning strategy in the reachability game pAT 1 , B ˆ tq
1
0u, F ˆ
pQ1ztq1suqq.
Moreover, from a positively winning strategy in the second game using memory of size N one can
effectively construct a T -compatible positively winning strategy in the reachability game pA, B, F q
that uses a memory of size OpN ˆ 2|S| ˆ |Q|q.
Proof. If Eve positively wins in pAT 1 , B ˆ tq
1
0
u, F ˆ pQ1ztq1suqq then we can safely assume that she
necessarily always plays authorised (according to Act1) actions (otherwise the play goes directly
to S ˆ tq1su and gets trap in it forever, hence cannot reach F ˆ pQ
1ztq1su), hence is T -compatible
thanks to Lemma 2. Such a strategy can be mimicked in the original game and it requires to
simulate automaton T 1 hence, costs an extra memory of size the one of T 1. Conversely, if it she
has a positively winning T -compatible strategy in the original game, the same strategy can be
mimicked in the reduced game and is still positively winning.
Now combining Lemma 3 together with Theorem 3 concludes the proof of Theorem 4.
4.4 The Case Where Adam Is More Informed Than Eve
We now assume that Adam is more informed than Eve and we fix an automaton T “ pQ,ΣE ˆ
S{„E , q0, qs, δT , Actq as in Section 4.3. Again, we are interested in checking whether Eve has a
T -compatible strategy that is positively winning in the reachability game pA, B, F q. The idea here
is to reduce this question to one on a game where Adam is perfectly informed and therefore
conclude thanks to Theorem 4.
Recall that in this setting, as noted in Remark 1, we can safely assume that, against a fixed
strategy of Eve, Adam observes the actions played by both players.
For this let H be all those subsets of S that consist of „A-equivalent states. For such a subset
H and for any pair of actions pσE , σAq P pΣE ˆΣAq define the set UppH,σE , σAq P H as follows. First,
define M “ ts1 P S | Ds P H s.t. δps, σE , σAqps
1q ą 0qu as the set of all possible successors of states
in H when playing the pair of actions pσE , σAq and let UppH,σE , σAq consist of all those non-empty
subsets H 1 that can be written as H 1 “ M X rss„A, i.e. all possible indistinguishable (for Adam)
subsets of M .
Define now a new arena A1 “ pH,ΣE ,ΣA, δ
1,«E ,«Aq by letting
• δ1pH,σE , σAqpH
1q “ 1{|UppH,σE, σAq| if H
1 P UppH,σE , σAq and 0 otherwise;
• H1 «E H2 if s1 „E s2 for every s1 P H1 and s2 P H2; and
• «A is the equality relation, i.e. Adam is perfectly informed.
Define the set of final states F 1 as those elements H in H such that H X F ‰ H.
Note that the equivalence classes of «E can be identified with the equivalence classes of „E
(because „AĎ„E) and therefore one can define T -compatible strategies for Eve also in a play in
A1. More generally, any Eve’s strategy in one game can be used in the other one.
For a set B Ď S define νpBq P H as νpBq “ ttsu | s P Bu. The following proposition relates game
pA, B, F q and game pA1, νpBq, F 1q.
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Proposition 3. A strategy of Eve is a positively winning T -compatible strategy in G “ pA, B, F q if
and only if it is a positively winning T -compatible strategy in G1 “ pA1, νpBq, F 1q.
Proof. Let ϕ be a positively winning T -compatible strategy in G. Now use ϕ in G1: obviously it
is still T -compatible and we only have to prove that it is positively winning. Consider a strategy
ψ1 of Adam in G1. Then, assuming Eve respects ϕ, strategy ψ1 can be mimicked in game G:
indeed, Adam simply has to update a state H in A1 which is done by computing UppH,σE , σAq and
observing the equivalence class for „A relation; assuming Eve respects ϕ it means that Adam
always knows what action σE she will play and therefore can compute UppH,σE , σAq. Call ψ the
strategy in G mimicking ψ1.
Now let N be some integer and consider all those partial plays of length N in G where Eve
respects ϕ and Adam respects ψ. Consider the „A-equivalent classes among these partial plays
and for every class consider the set H of possible last states. Then those such H are exactly those
states that can be reached in G1 in a partial play of length N when Eve respects ϕ and Adam
respects ψ1. As ϕ is positively winning in G , thanks to Proposition 1 there is some N such that
Eve positively wins within the N first moves and therefore for the same N we conclude that Eve
positively wins within the N first moves in G1 using ϕ against ψ1. As this property does not depend
on ψ1 we conclude that ϕ is positively winning in G1.
Conversely, assume she has a positively winning T -compatible strategy in G1. Now use ϕ in
G: obviously it is still T -compatible and we only have to prove that it is positively winning. By
contradiction, assume Adam has a strategy ψ that ensures, provided Eve uses ϕ in G, that no
final state is reached. Then, from ψ one can define a strategy in ψ1 that consists in a partial
play H0pσ
0
E , σ
0
AqH1pσ
1
E , σ
1
Aq ¨ ¨ ¨Hk to play action ψprs0s„A ¨ ¨ ¨ rsks„Aq where si is any (they are all „A-
equivalent) element in Hi for every i. Using the same argument as in the direct implication
relating plays in G when using strategies pϕ, ψq and plays in G1 when using strategies pϕ1, ψ1q, one
concludes that playing ψ1 against ϕ in G1 ensures that no final state is visited hence, leading a
contradiction with ϕ being positively winning in G1.
Combining Proposition 3 with Theorem 4 directly leads the following result.
Theorem 5. When Adam is more informed than Eve, one can decide in double exponential time in
|S| and polynomial in |Q| whether Eve has a T -compatible strategy that is positively winning in the
reachability game pA, B, F q. If such a strategy exists, one can construct one that uses memory of
size polynomial in |Q| and doubly exponential in |S|.
5 Almost-Surely Winning for Büchi Conditions
For the rest of this section fix an arena A “ pS,ΣE ,ΣA, δ,„E,„Aq and a set of final states F Ď S. We
are interested in almost-sure winning strategies, and we focus on Büchi conditions, as a solution
for this case permits to obtain a solution for reachability condition by a simple reduction (change
the arena so that whenever a final state is reached then the play stays in it forever). For the
moment we do not make any assumption on how Adam is informed.
We show how to compute the set of almost-surely winning beliefs of Eve, denoted BAS, which
is the set of subsets B Ď S such that B Ď rss„E for some s P S and for which Eve has an almost-
surely winning strategy in the Büchi game GB “ pA, B, F q. For some B P B
AS we let rBs„E “ rss„E
for s P S such that B Ď rss„E .
5.1 Fixpoint Characterisation
Lemma 4 below states that the set BAS can be expressed as the greatest fix-point of a (monotone)
mapping Ξ : 22
S
Ñ 22
S
defined as follows. Let B Ď 2S and let B P B. We say that B belongs to ΞpBq
if Eve has a strategy in the reachability game pA, B, F q which is positively winning and guarantees
that her belief always stays in B.
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Lemma 4. BAS is the greatest fixpoint of Ξ.
Proof. We first argue that BAS is a fixpoint for Ξ. For this we consider any B P BAS and prove that
B P ΞpBASq. We denote by GB the Büchi game pA, B, F q and we start with a simple lemma.
Lemma 5. Let B P BAS. Let ϕ be any strategy for Eve that is almost-surely winning for her in GB
and let σE “ ϕprBs„E q. Then, for any σA P ΣA, for any t such that Ds P B with δps, σE , σAqptq ą 0,
UpBeliefEpB, σE , rts„Eq P B
AS.
Proof. Consider some action σA and some t such that δps, σE , σAqptq ą 0 and let B
1 “ UpBeliefEpB, σE , rts„E q.
By definition of UpBeliefE, for every t
1 P B1, there is some s1 P B and some action σt
1
A such that
δps1, σE , σ
t1
Aqpt
1q ą 0. Now, define the strategy ϕ1 of Eve by letting ϕ1pλq “ ϕprss„E ¨ λq for any partial
play λ. We claim that ϕ1 is almost-surely winning for Eve in Gt1 for any t
1 P B1, hence implying that
B1 P BAS. By contradiction, assume that ϕ1 is not almost-surely winning for some Gt1 with t
1 P B1
and let ψ1 be a counter-strategy for Adam in Gt1 , i.e. Pr
ϕ1,ψ1
t1 pOq ă 1 (recall that O denotes here the
Büchi objective). Now, pick s1 P B such that δps1, σE , σ
t1
Aqpt
1q ą 0 and define a strategy ψ of Adam by
letting ψps1q “ σt
1
A and ψps
1 ¨ λq “ ψ1pλq. Then as Prϕ
1,ψ1
t1 pOq ă 1 one also has that Pr
ϕ,ψ
s1 pOq ă 1 which
leads to a contradiction.
Fix a strategy ϕB as in Lemma 5: a play λ in GB where Eve respects ϕB is such that Belief
B
Epλq P
BAS. Moreover, as ϕB is almost-surely winning for the Büchi game GB, it is in particular positively
winning in the reachability game pA, B, F q. Hence, using Proposition 1, one gets a bound NB and
some εB, meaning that the probability of a play λ in GB where Eve respects ϕB to visit a final
state within its first NB moves is ě εB. Hence, B P ΞpB
ASq, implying that BAS is a fixpoint for Ξ.
Now we show that any fixpoint of Ξ is included in BAS. For this assume that ΞpBq “ B
for some B. As any B P B is such that B P ΞpBq it comes with some ϕB, NB and εB. We let
N “ max tNB | B P Bu and ε “ min tεB | B P Bu.
Now we define a strategy ϕ that consists in playing in rounds of length N : at the beginning of
some round, Eve considers her current belief H and plays according to ϕH in the next N moves;
then she restarts with the updated belief, and so on forever.
Now consider some B P B. We claim that ϕ is almost-surely winning for Eve in any in GB.
Indeed, from the properties of the ϕH , it follows that any play in GB where Eve respects ϕ is such
that the belief is in B. Now, as the ϕH ensure to visit a final state with probability ě ε in less than
N moves the Borel-Cantelli Lemma implies that ϕ is almost-surely winning. Hence, B P BAS and
this concludes the proof.
5.2 Decidability Issues
As Ξ is monotone for set inclusion, it suffices to compute BAS by successive applications (starting
with the set of all subsets) of the operator Ξ until reaching the fixpoint. Since BAS Ď 2S, the
fixpoint is reached in at most 2|S| steps.
Now, as noted in Remark 5 the property for a strategy to guarantee that Eve’s belief remains
in a set B can be expressed as the strategy being TB-compatible (and the number of states of TB
is at most exponential in |S|). Therefore, thanks to Theorem 4 (resp. Theorem 5) every step in
the fixpoint computation can be achieved in time exponential (resp. doubly exponential) in |S| if
Adam is perfectly informed (resp. more informed than Eve). This leads the following result.
Theorem 6. Let G be a Büchi (or reachability) game with n states.
• If Adam is perfectly informed, one can decide whether Eve has an almost-surely winning
strategy in time exponential in n. If such a strategy exists, it can be effectively constructed
and requires memory at most exponential in n.
• If Adam is more informed than Eve, one can decide whether Eve has an almost-surely win-
ning strategy in time doubly exponential in n. If such a strategy exists, it can be effectively
constructed and requires memory at most doubly exponential in n.
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Proof. Decidability follows from Theorem 4/Theorem 5 and the fixpoint characterisation given in
Lemma 4. The result on the strategies is also a consequence of Theorem 4/Theorem 5 combined
with Corollary 1 which permits to bound the size of N in the proof of Lemma 4.
6 Lower Bound
We now give a matching lower bound to the upper bounds in Theorem 5 and in Theorem 6
for the case where Adam is more informed than Eve. Note that in the case where Adam is
perfectly informed one can get a matching lower bound (ExpTime-hardness) as in the case where
randomised strategies are allowed [7]. Also note that in the case where Adam is more informed
than Eve similar lower bounds, when randomised strategies are allowed, were obtained in [13,
2, 3] for almost-sure winning3; however, even if the ideas of the proof below are similar to the
ones in [13, 2, 3], namely the players simulate a run of an exponential space alternating Turing
machine while gadgets prevent cheating, there is a slight but crucial difference. Indeed, Eve is in
charge of describing the successive configuration while in previous proofs Adam was; we actually
believe that this is needed for the proof to work (mainly because we are not only interested in
almost-sure winning but also in positively winning).
Theorem 7. Deciding whether Eve has a positively winning (resp. an almost-surely winning) strat-
egy in a reachability game where Adam is more informed than her is a 2-ExpTime-hard problem.
Proof. The idea is to simulate a computation of an alternating Turing machine that uses a space
of exponential size and to reduce termination to almost-surely winning for Eve. As alternating
Turing machines of exponential space are equivalent to deterministic Turing machines working
in doubly exponential time it permits to obtain the desired lower bound. We can safely assume
that the tape alphabet A contains a blank symbol as well as a special symbol 7, and that initially
the input tape is made of n successive 7 symbols followed by 2n´n blank symbols. A configuration
of the machine can be described by a word of length 2n in A˚QA˚ where Q is the set of states of
the machine (including some final states): the meaning of a configuration a1 ¨ ¨ ¨aℓqaℓ`1 ¨ ¨ ¨ a2n is
that the tape content is a1 ¨ ¨ ¨ aℓa2n , the state is q and the reading/writing head is on the ℓ-th cell.
A run of the machine is a sequence of successive configurations separated by transitions of the
machine; it is accepting if it contains a final configuration (and in that case the run is of finite
length; otherwise it is of infinite length).
A classical way of thinking of an alternating Turing machine is as a game where Eve is in
charge of the choice of transitions when the machine is in an existential state while Adam takes
care of the universal states. The machine accepts if and only if Eve has a winning strategy to
eventually reach a configuration with a final control state.
Consider now the following (informal) game. Eve is in charge of describing the run of the
Turing machine (her actions’ alphabet contains all the necessary symbols for that i.e. AYQ that
permits the game to go in some associated states). After she described a configuration either she
(in case the state is existential) or Adam (in case the state is universal) describes a valid transition
of the machine (again by playing some special actions), and then Eve describes the successive
configuration and so on until possibly a final configuration is reached (in which case she wins the
game). Hence, in the game’s state one stores the state (of the Turing machine) when described as
well as the adjacent symbols; this information is used when Eve/Adam has to describe the next
transition of the machine (that should be consistent).
Of course the problem is that Eve could cheat by not describing a valid run. For this, Adam
can, in every configuration, secretly (i.e. Eve does not observe it) mark a cell of the tape, and
in the next configuration he can indicate a cell (supposedly of same index than the previously
marked one) and it is checked whether it has been wrongly updated: this is easily done as the
cell before and after the marked cell have been stored in the arena (and Eve does not observe it of
course) and together with the transition one can compute the correct update of the cell. Now in
3Actually the lower bound in [13] uses a game where none of the player is more informed than the other but it is easily
seen how to modify it to obtain a game where Adam is more informed than Eve
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case there is indeed a wrong update of the cell content, the play restarts (i.e. the players restart
from the initial configuration of the Turing machine); otherwise the play goes to a final state and
Eve wins. Hence, in the game’s state one also stores (and hides to Eve) information of a cell
marked by Adam and of the adjacent symbols for a later check. This marking by Adam as well as
the checking later is done by him playing a distinguished action.
One problem in the previous simulation is that Adam could cheat by indicating two cells that
are not with the same index. If the space used by the machine was of linear size, one could of
course store the actual index and formally check it. Here, we use an extra coding to circumvent
this problem. When describing the configuration, after every symbol Eve produces a sequence of
n bits whose meaning is to describe, in binary counting, the index of the last symbol. When she
describes such a binary number, Adam can secretly mark a bit that he claims will be not correctly
updated when describing the index of the next symbol (for this he just plays an action that stands
for a number between 1 and n) and this is checked next: if she made an incorrect update, the play
restarts (i.e. the players restart from the initial configuration of the Turing machine); otherwise
the play goes to a final state where she wins. Hence, in the game’s state one also stores (and hides
to Eve) the index (between 1 and n) of a bit marked by Adam as well as the value corresponding
to the bit of the same index in the incremented version of the described number (this can be
computed on the fly). This marking by Adam is done by him playing a distinguished action; the
checking is done deterministically (thanks to a counter). One also uses this binary encoding
of the index of the cell in the following way: whenever Adam marks a symbol that he claims
will be incorrectly updated in the next configuration, a bit of its binary encoding is guessed (i.e.
randomly chosen) and its index is stored and not observed by none of the players. Later, when
Adam indicates the supposed corresponding symbol in the next configuration, the guessed bit is
checked and should match: if not the play goes to a final state and Eve wins; otherwise one does
as previously explained (i.e. one checks whether the symbol is correct: if not the play restarts
otherwise the play goes to a final state and Eve wins). Hence, in the game’s state one also stores
(and hides to both players) the value and index of the randomly chosen bit.
We claim that Eve positively wins (equivalently almost-surely wins) this game if and only if the
Turing machine accepts. Once this is established, the proof will be over, as one can easily notice
that the previous informal game can be encoded formally as a two-player game with imperfect
information of polynomial size in the one of the Turing machine.
First, assume that the Turing machine accepts. Hence, it means that the existential player
Eve has a winning strategy in the acceptance game of the machine. Now, mimic this strategy
in the above described game: Eve always makes a correct description of a run and, when she
has to choose a transition of the machine, she does as in her winning strategy in the acceptance
game of the machine. We claim that this strategy is almost-surely winning (hence, also positively
winning). Indeed, any strategy of Adam that does not infinitely often claim that a cell is incorrectly
updated is surely losing for him because either he makes a wrong claim (actually his claims are
always wrong but here we mean he get discovered because of the hidden bit), or after some point
the simulation goes to the end and finishes by a final configuration of the Turing machine. Now,
against this strategy of Eve, when Adam infinitely often claims that a cell is incorrectly updated,
he almost-surely gets caught because at every claim there is a (fixed positive) probability (at least
1{n) that the secret bit does not match, and therefore, by Borel-Cantelli Lemma, the probability
that he gets caught eventually is 1. Of course, if Adam claims at some point that a bit is incorrectly
updated by Eve he also looses (because she describes a valid run). Hence, Eve’s strategy almost-
surely defeats any strategy of Adam.
Conversely, assume that the Turing machine does not accept. Hence, it means that the exis-
tential player Eve has no winning strategy in the acceptance game of the machine. Now, consider
a strategy of Eve. There are two possibilities.
• Either there is a strategy4 of Adam against which Eve’s strategy eventually cheats. Then,
consider the strategy of Adam that plays the same except that he points the moment where
she cheats: then, Eve must behave the same and therefore the play restarts. Now, consider
4In fact a set of indistinguishable strategies from Eve’s point of view, including the ones where Adam claims she cheats.
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how she behaves in the restarted play and do the same reasoning. If we are always in the
same situation, by iteratively playing a strategy pointing where she cheats in every simula-
tion of the Turing machine ensures that no final configuration is reached and therefore that
she surely looses.
• Or, against any strategy of Adam, Eve’s strategy never cheats (i.e. describes a valid run).
Hence, Eve’s strategy can be seen as a strategy in the acceptance game of the machine
and therefore, one can consider the strategy of the universal player that beats it in the
acceptance game and let Adam mimic it in the simulation game (and he never claims that
she cheats). Then, this strategy leads to an infinite play that corresponds to the description
of an infinite run of the alternating Turing machine that never visits a final configuration:
hence, it surely defeats Eve’s strategy
In conclusion, for any strategy of Eve in the above described game there is a strategy of Adam
that surely beats this strategy, which implies that there is no positively winning (hence almost-
surely winning) strategy for Eve. This terminates the proof.
7 Summary
In this paper we considered finite state games in which, at each round, the two players (called
Eve and Adam) choose concurrently an action and based on these actions the successor state is
chosen according to some fixed probability distribution. We considered several classical winning
conditions: safety, reachability, Büchi and co-Büchi. Moreover, the players are imperfectly in-
formed: each player has an equivalence relation over states and, instead of observing the exact
state, he observes its equivalence class. Finally, we restricted our attention to pure strategies, i.e.
we forbid the players to randomise when choosing their actions.
We studied the decidability and complexity status of the problem of deciding whether Eve
has a positively (resp. almost-surely) winning strategy. To obtain positive results, we imposed
restrictions on how Adam is informed: we considered the case where he has perfect information
and the case where he is more informed than Eve.
The landscape of decidability and undecidability results with pointers to the literature and
to the results in our paper are shown in the Table 1. The entries of the form “1/2-Exptime-
complete” refer to the two cases of Adam being perfectly informed and being better informed than
Eve, respectively (the results from [8] are for the case of Adam being perfectly informed). The
implication ñ means that our result is an easy consequence of a result from the literature. The
undecidability results already hold for the case in which Adam is perfectly informed.
Safety Reachability Büchi co-Büchi
Positively Undecidable 1/2-Exptime-complete Undecidable Undecidable
Th. 2 [8], Th. 3/Th. 5 + Th. 7 [1] ñ Th. 1 Th. 2
Almost ExpTime-comp. 1/2-Exptime-complete 1/2-Exptime-complete Undecidable
Sure [4] [8], Th. 6 + Th. 7 Th. 6 + Th. 7 [1] ñ Th. 1
Table 1: Landscape of decidability and undecidability results
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